

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJ: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS: EXCEPTIONS

TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NO. 122

REF: MOSCOW 2575

MOSCOW 2632 PARAS 1 AND 2

1. SUMMARY: IN RESTRICTED MEETING MARCH 12 MOROKHOV STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT THE USSR ALWAYS HAS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON EXCEPTIONS TO 150 KT YIELD LIMIT FOR SOME NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS. THAT IS INTENTION IN PARA 9 ARTICLE VI OF NEW USSR SINGLE PROTOCOL TEXT, AND IS FIRM SOVIET POSITION. HE BRUSHED ASIDE FEB 19 DISCUSSION (REFTELS); IN EFFECT, RENDERING IT INOPERATIVE. SOTESSEL, EQUALLY CATEGORICALLY, MADE CLEAR -- RECALLING KISSINGER/GROMYKO JANUARY 23 CONVERSATION -- THAT THIS UNACCEPTABLE TO US. IN THAT CASE, MOROKHOV SAID ISSUE SHOULD BE PASSED "TO OUR SUPERIORS" SINCE USSR INSTRUCTIONS EQUALLY FIRMS. END SUMMARY.

2. US SOUGHT CLARIFICATION PARA 9 ARTICLE VI OF NEW USSR SINGLE PROTOCOL TEXT PROVIDING FOR EXCEPTIONS TO 150-KT YIELD LIMIT FOR INDIVIDUAL/EXPLOSIVES IN MARCH 12 RESTRICTED MEETING (STOESSEL/BUCHHEIM/MARTIN/TATISTCHEFF - MOROKHOV/TIMERBAEV/BOCHAROV/MILKO).

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STOESSEL SAID PARA 9 CONTRARY TO US UNDERSTANDING OF

FEBRUARY 19 DISCUSSION IN WHICH MOROKHOV CLEARLY STATED THAT USSR HAD NEVER PROPOSED AND HAD NO INTENTION OF USING INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIVES ABOVE 150 KT. US HAD UNDERSTOOD MOROKHOV TO EXPLAIN USSR APPROACH AS INVOLVING MULTIPLE EXPLOSIONS OF LESS THAN 150 KT IN YIELD AND SPACED TOO CLOSELY TO PERMIT IDENTIFICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS IN THE GROUP.

3. MOROKHOV SMILED AND SAID CLEARLY THERE HAD BEEN MISUNDERSTANDING ON US PART, FOR STOESSEL HAD JUST DESCRIBED ONE ILLUSTRATION USED BY MOROKHOV FEBRUARY 19. PARA 9 PERMITS, AS US HAS CORRECTLY READ IT, INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIVES GREATER THAN 150 KT IN YIELD. MOROKHOV REMINDED STOESSEL THAT EXCEPTIONS QUESTION HAS LONG HISTORY, AND INDEED "WAS DISCUSSED IN THIS ROME IN 1974."

4. MOROKHOV STATED AGAIN THAT PARA 9 PROVIDES FOR EXCEPTIONS, AND USSR INSISTS ON THIS SINCE NUMBER OF PLANNED PNE PROJECTS CONTEMPLATE HIGHER THAN 150-KT YIELDS. ADDITIONALLY, ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRE EXCEPTIONS. HOWEVER, MOROKHOV SAID PARA 9 DOES PROVIDE A VETO TO THE OTHER PARTY, ALTHOUGH USSR WOULD EXPECT US TO HAVE "COMMON SENSE" APPROACH, BEARING IN MIND TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS.

5. STOESSEL SAID EXPECTATIONS UNACCEPTABLE TO US. HE RECALLED NUMBER OF TIMES HE HAD CLEARLY MADE THIS POINT TO MOROKHOV AND REHEARSED, AS HE HAD FEBRUARY 19, KISSINGER/GROMYKO JANUARY 23 DISCUSSION IN WHICH SECRETARY HAD MADE CLEAR US WOULD NOT ACCEPT EXCEPTIONS. AS SECRETARY HAD TOLD GROMYKO, ONLY WAY TO HANDLE EXCEPTIONS IS TO POSTPONE ISSUE AND CONSIDER IT AT TIME OF FIVE-YEAR PNE TREATY REVIEW.

6. STOESSEL THEN RECALLED MOROKHOV FEBRUARY 19 DESCRIPTION OF SOVIET INTENTION NOT TO USE INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIVES OVER 150 KT, THAT USSR HAD NEVER PROPOSED SUCH A THING, AND ONLY HAD IN MIND MULTIPLE EXPLOSIVES LESS THAN 150 KT WITH VERY CLOSE SPACING. HE SAID US WILLING TO CONSIDER LATTER POSSIBILITY IF VERIFICATION COULD BE

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WORKED OUT. US HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY HEARTENED BY MOROKHOV FEBRUARY 19 PRESENTATION, BUT FOUND REVERSION TO OLD USSR POSITION DISHEARTENING AND, OF COURSE, UNACCEPTABLE.

7. MOROKHOV SAID HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND LOGIC OF REFUSING EXCEPTIONS SINCE "WE KNOW THERE ARE PROJECTS IS US OF 500 KT FOR ROCK FRACTURING PRUPOSES

IN ORDER TO SAVE MONEY." FROM US COMMENTS HE UNDERSTANDS US POSITION TO BE "MORE POLITICAL" THAN BASED ON "SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL GROUNDS," AND LINKED TO TTBT AND QUESTION OF WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS. USSR UNDERSTANDS THAT POINT AND THIS REASON WHY PARA 9 SPECIFIES VERY STRICT VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.

8. MOROKHOV WENT ON TO ASSERT THAT TTBT CONTAINS NO LIMITS ON PNE THRESHOLD. USSR HAS ALWAYS BEEN AGAINST PNE YIELD LIMIT BUT HAS AGREED TO 150 KT THRESHOLD "WITH SMALL NUMBER OF EXCEPTIONS".

9. USSR ALSO THINKS PNE THRESHOLD WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO GOAL OF NON-PROLIFERATION. INDEED, MOROKHOV SAID, IMPOSING PNE THRESHOLD UNDERMINES NPT ARTICLE V, AND WOULD SUBJECT US AND USSR TO "SERIOUS CRITICISM" FROM COUNTRIES WANTING FULL PNE BENEFITS. MOROKHOV SAID "NUMBER OF COUNTRIES AIM TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS PNES, PARTICULARLY SEVERAL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.Z

10. FOLLOWING US APPROACH, MOROKHOV SAID, WOULD INVOLVE "A DECEPTION." FOR EXAMPLE, IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO VERIFY WHETHER SINGLE HOLE CONTAINED TWO 150-KT EXPLOSIVES OR SINGLE 300-KT EXPLOSIVE. USSR COULD PUT TWO CANISTERS IN SINGLE HOLE WITH ONE EMPTY AND ONE CONTAINING 300-KT EXPLOSIVE AND , MOROKHOV CONCLUDED SMILING, "US WOULD NEVER KNOW THE DIFFERENCE AND COULD NOT VERIFY THAT SITUATION."

11. MOROKHOV SAID IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO RELATE PNE YIELDS TO TTBT YIELD LIMIT. IS THE US SUGGESTING THAT IF CTB AGREED TOMORROW THERE WOULD BE NO MORE PNES? USSR DOES NOT SUPPORT THAT.

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12. STOESSEL MADE CLEAR THAT PNES EXCEEDING TTBT YIELD LIMIT WOULD INVOLVE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM AS SECRETARY HAD EXPLAINED TO GROMYKO. US DID NOT BELIEVE THAT A 150-KT PNE THRESHOLD WOULD INVOLVE NPT DIFFICULTIES OF ANY SORT. HE DID AGREE WITH MOROKHOV THAT IN VIEW USSR POSITION ON EXCEPTIONS IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT FURTHER PROGRESS THIS ISSUE POSSIBLE AS BETWEEN DELEGATIONS, AND IT APPROPRIATE FOR HIGHER LEVEL.

13. MOROKHOV CONCLUDED BY ASSERTING THAT DIFFERENCES ON EXCEPTIONS "NOT CLOSELY CONNECTED" WITH OTHER PNE ISSUES, AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT IMPEDE GETTING ON WITH REST OF JOB.
STOESSEL

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